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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal involves the lease of dairy facilities in Newton, 
Utah. The owners and Lessors of these facilities and the 
Plaintiffs and Appellees in this case are Norval R. Jones and 
Delores S. Jones. Norval R. Jones and Delores S. Jones, when 
referred to collectively in this brief will be referred to as 
Jones. The Jones when referred to separately will be referred to 
as "Mr." and "Mrs.". The Lessee in said Lease is the Defendant and 
Appellant, Michael J. Arambel. Michael J. Arambel will be referred 
to in this brief as Arambel. References to the Clerk's record will 
be by the designation "R" followed by the page in the record. 
Reference to the transcript of the trial will be by the letter MT" 
followed by the page and line. All emphasis is added unless 
otherwise noted. Pivotal documents in this appeal are a Lease 
between Jones as Lessors and Arambel as Lessee which was introduced 
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, (the Lease), a Contract of 
Sale between Jones as Sellers and Arambel as Buyer which was 
introduced in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, (the Contract), 
the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 1995 (R. 
102), the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered April 14, 1995 which are in the record at page 108, (the 
Findings of Fact), the Trial Court's Judgment and Decree entered 
April 14, 1995 which is in the record at page 113, (the Judgment 
and Decree), and the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated July 
5, 1995 which is in the record at page 149, (the Second Memorandum 
Decision). 
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For ease of reference by this Court, in the Addendum to this 
brief are a copy of the Lease marked "Lease", a copy of the 
Contract marked as "Contract", a copy of the Trial Court's 
Memorandum Decision marked "Mem. Dec", a copy of the Findings of 
Fact marked "F. of Fact", a copy of the Judgment and Decree marked 
"J. and Decree", and a copy of the Second Memorandum Decision 
marked "Sec. Mem. Dec." 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred on this Court by 
78-2a-3(2) (k) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. The Order of 
the Utah Supreme Court pouring this case over to this Court is 
found in R. 166. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Jones had a 
continuing expectation that Arambel would return to the Leased 
Premises? The standard for review of this issue is "clearly 
erroneous". Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Alta 
Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1992) . This issue was 
preserved on appeal by Arambel raising and arguing the issue in a 
Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71). 
2. Whether Jones accepted Arambel's surrender of the Leased 
Premises thereby terminating the Lease? The standard for review of 
this issue is "clearly erroneous". Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Alta Industries, supra, Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9 (Utah 
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(Utah App. 1994) . This issue was preserved on appeal by Arambel 
raising and arguing the issue in a Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71) . 
3. Whether the Trial Court's finding that Jones had not 
accepted surrender of the Leased Premises was correct? The 
standard for review of this issue is "clearly erroneous". Rule 
52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Alta Industries, supra, and 
State of Utah v. Jose Carlos Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . This 
issue was preserved on appeal by Arambel raising and arguing the 
issue in a Post Trial Memorandum (R. 71) . 
4. Whether, under the facts of this case the Trial Court 
erred in finding that a reasonable time for Jones to mitigate their 
damage was one (1) year? The standard for review of this issue is 
correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 
870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved on appeal by 
Arambel raising and arguing the issue in a Post Trial Memorandum R. 
71) . 
5. Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding Jones their 
attorney's fees and whether this Court should award Jones their 
attorney's fees in this appeal? The standard for review of this 
issue is correctness. United Park City Mines, supra, Andreason v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) . 
Arambel preserved this issue on appeal by raising it in a Post 
Trial Memorandum (R. 71). 
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APPLICABLE RULE 
The Rule of procedure having application in this case is "Rule 
52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as 
follows: 
"Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law ther€>on, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocu-
tory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Trial Court on Jones 
action to enforce the provisions of a Lease of dairy facilities in 
Newton, Utah between Jones as Lessors and Arambel as Lessee. The 
Lease ran from September 1, L989 through August 31, 1994. Arambel 
moved his cows off the Leased Premises in August of 1991, ceased 
making payments on the Lease in July of 1992 but continued to 
occupy the Leased Premises, at least in part, until December of 
When Arambel ceased making payments on the Lease, Jones sued 
him for delinquent rental payments of $1,600.00 per month and for 
damages beyond reasonable wear to the Leased Premises. (R. 3, 4 
and 31) . Arambel defended on the grounds that Jones had accepted 
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surrender of the Leased Premises and thereby released Arambel from 
the Lease and also that Jones had failed to mitigate their damages. 
The case was tried to the Honorable Ben Hadfield who held the 
Lease had not been terminated and that Jones had a right to collect 
rental payments for a period of one (1) year from July, 1992 
through June of 1993, less mitigating offsets of $3,650.00, plus 
interest, damages to the Leased Premises and reasonable attorney's 
fees. After Arambel's motion to alter or amend the Findings of 
Fact and Judgment and Decree of the Court were denied, Arambel 
brought this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arambel's Brief omits several material facts and Jones 
therefore restate the facts for the purpose of including all 
relevant facts. 
Mr. Jones had been a dairy farmer for his entire life until 
August of 1989 when Jones entered into a Lease of their dairy 
facilities in Newton, Utah to Arambel. (T. p. 16 Is. 18-20 and the 
Lease) . 
The Jones own agricultural property other than the dairy 
facilities they leased to Arambel which Mr. Jones continued to farm 
after and Arambel Jones entered into the Lease. (T. p. 19 Is. 14, 
25 and p. 20 Is. 1-13). It was contemplated when the parties 
entered into the Lease that the alfalfa and barley produced by the 
Jones on their other property would be available to Arambel to feed 
to his dairy cows. To this end, the hay produced by Jones was 
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placed in barns and the haylage was placed in a pit on the Leased 
Premises and purchased and used from these facilities by Arambel. 
(T. p. 20 Is. 3-13) . 
The term of the Lease was five (5) years from September 1, 
1989 until August 31, 1994 arid the monthly rental under the Lease 
was $1,600.00 per month beginning October 1, 1989 and running 
through and including September 1, 1994 (Lease, paragraphs 2 and 
4) . Concurrent with the Lease, the Jones entered into a Contract 
of Sale to sell their cows to Arambel (the Contract) . The purchase 
price on the Contract of Sale was $207,600.00, payable $4,750.00 on 
the 15th of each month beginning October 15, 1989. (Contract, 
paragraph 5). 
The Contract provided, among other things, as follows: 
"17. Concurrent Lease. Concurrent with the 
execution and delivery of this Contract, the Seller as 
Lessor and the Buyer as Lessee will enter into a written 
Lease (the "Lease") of property and improvements in 
Newton, Utah whereon the cows are presently being housed 
and kept. The Lease is an integral part of this 
transaction whereby the cows and the base are being sold 
to Buyer. It is, therefore, expressly understood and 
agreed that any default on the Lease will constitute a 
default on this Contract, and any such default on the 
Lease shall make available to Seller all remedies on 
default provided in this Contract as well as and in 
addition to all remedies provided in the Lease upon the 
default of the Lessee." 
The Lease contains the following reciprocal provision: 
"12. A default on the Contract shall constitute a 
default on this Lease and shall make available to Lessor 
all remedies on default provided in the Contract and in 
this Lease." 
The Lease also required in paragraph 3 thereof that Arambel 
keep the cows on the leased property at all times during the term 
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of the Lease and at no other location until the Contract and the 
Lease were completely performed by Arambel. Further, the Lease 
provided in paragraph 6, that: 
"Lessee agrees to care for and to maintain all of 
the improvements constituting a part of the leased 
premises and all equipment constituting a part of the 
leased premises in their condition as at the beginning of 
this Lease, reasonable wear accepted. Lessee covenants 
and agrees to promptly repair in a workmanlike manner all 
damage to improvements and all equipment constituting a 
part of the leased premises at Lessee's sole cost and 
expense." 
The Lease provided that the parties would cooperate in manure 
removal from the Leased Premises and that manure produced by the 
cows would be applied to land owned by Jones unless the Jones 
otherwise directed. (Lease, paragraph 10) . 
The Contract also provided that Arambel could not prepay any 
part of the purchase price without the prior written consent of the 
Jones and then only on such terms and conditions as Jones may 
specify in writing in advance of any permitted payment. (Lease, 
paragraph 6). 
Mr. Jones testified that he would not have made the sale of 
the cows without the Lease. (T. p. 18 Is. 20-22). Mrs. Jones 
testified likewise. (T. p. 168 Is. 7-25). 
After the Lease and Contract were signed, Arambel went into 
possession of the Leased Premises. Mr. Jones proceeded to produce 
feed which he placed in the hay barn and haylage bunker on the 
leased property and Arambel purchased the hay and haylage thus 
produced by Jones. (T. pgs. 23, 24, 25 and 26) . The last haylage 
Jones placed in the haylage silo on the leased property and sold to 
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Arambel was removed by Arambel in December of 1992. (T. p. 2 6 Is. 
6-8) . 
In June or July of 1991, Arambel approached Jones about paying 
off the Contract and moving the cows off the leased property. (T. 
p. 26 Is. 9-25 and p. 27 Is. 1-10) . The parties ultimately agreed 
that the Contract could be paid off for $155,800.00 in August of 
1991. Had the Contract continued according to its terms, the Jones 
would have received a total of $175,627.00 from Arambel. 
(Contract, Exhibit 2, paragraiph 4(a)). 
At the time the parties negotiated for the payoff of the 
Contract, they also discussed the continuation of the Lease. Mr. 
Jones told Arambel that it was imperative that the Lease Agreement 
continue even if the cows were moved. Jones asked Arambel how he 
could pay the Lease if he moveid the cows and Arambel stated that if 
he moved his cows to another operation where he was already milking 
cows, it would be more efficient for him having the cows in one 
place and that he could make that up. (T. p. 29 Is. 12-25 and p. 
30 Is. 1-5). Mr. Jones testified: 
"Q. Okay. So the totality of the agreement for the 
payoff of the cows was that he would pay you $155,800.00. 
Is that correct?" 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that he would continue to pay the Lease to its 
term? 
A. That's correct. 
(T. p. 30 Is. 17-23). Mr. Jones further testified that he would 
not have all allowed the cow Contract to be paid off and the cows 
removed from the Leased Premises if he had not had Arambel's firm 
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agreement to continue the Lease. (T. p. 31 Is. 9-14). Mrs. Jones 
testified "It was the one thing I kept stressing that he had to 
keep paying the lease arrangement because that was the income we 
were planning on using" and that she would not have permitted the 
Contract be paid off and the cows moved off the Leased Premises if 
the Lease was not going to continue (T. p. 168 Is. 15-21). 
After Arambel paid off the Contract, he continued to pay the 
Lease until June of 1992 at which time he ceased lease payments. 
(T. p. 12 Is. 12-21). 
Although Arambel moved his cows from the Leased Premises in 
August of 1991, he continued to use the silage pit on the Leased 
Premises for the storage of haylage until December of 1992 (T. p. 
25 Is. 12-20) and his tenant vacated the home in October or 
November of 1992 (T. pgs. 47 and 48). After Arambel had removed 
his cows, haylage and tenant, Jones continued to keep the premises 
available for Arambel to use after December, 1992. (T. p. 42 Is. 
3-5) . 
Prior to the time that Arambel vacated the property, Jones and 
Arambel used each other's equipment for manure removal (T. pgs. 37 
and 38), Jones allowed Arambel to use other corals not subject to 
the Lease free of charge from the summer of 1990 to August or 
September of 1991 (T. p. 36 Is. 11-21), and Arambel used Jones' 
shop and equipment to repair his machinery (T. p. 232 Is. 24-25 and 
p. 233) . The parties generally reciprocated in use of each others 
equipment (T. p. 37 Is. 16 and 17). 
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After Arambel vacated the Leased Premises, Jones had three (3) 
opportunities to lease the property for short periods of time. 
Because Arambel had agreed as a part of the payoff of the Lease to 
continue leasing the property until the end of its term, Mr. Jones 
did not consider that he had any authority to let the property to 
anyone else. (T. p. 107 Is. 8-15). In any event, none of the 
three (3) parties who contacted Jones were acceptable tenants to 
Jones had he been in a position to lease the property. One tenant 
was Todd Davis, who just wanted to milk cows on the property until 
he sold them, the second was a person named Goodyear who just 
wanted the property for five (5) or six (6) months, and the other 
was a person who wanted Jones to carry him for a period of time. 
For these reasons, none of these tenants were acceptable to Jones. 
(T. pgs. 106-109) . 
This litigation ensued when Arambel ceased making lease 
payments after the June, 1992 payment. However, Jones never did 
take any action to terminate the Lease. They always considered the 
Lease to be in full force and effect and their suit was to recover 
payments due on the Lease until its termination and for damages 
caused by Arambel to the Leased Premises. (Plaintiff's Complaint 
and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) . The Lease provides for payment of 
costs and attorney's fees (Lease, paragraph 19). 
After Arambel's tenant moved out of the home on the Leased 
Premises in October or November of 1992, Jones sold the home for 
$45,000.00 (T. p. 58 Is. 3-7). The portion of the selling price 
allocated to the home was $30,000.00 (T. p. 58 Is. 11-12). The 
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sale occurred in May of 1993 (T. p. 101 Is. 15-18) . Two (2) of the 
tractors leased by Arambel were inoperable when Arambel moved his 
cattle from the Leased Premises. Contrary to the provisions of the 
Lease, Arambel never repaired these items of equipment and 
ultimately Jones traded them in on new equipment which, Jones 
testified, could have been used by Arambel at his option. (T. p. 
159 Is. 16-25) . 
After Arambel vacated the Leased Premises, Jones kept twenty-
six (26) head of heifers in a corral on the Leased Premises. Mr. 
Jones testified that he did so pursuant to an agreement with 
Arambel (T. pgs. 39-40), and that he placed hay in the barn as he 
had done in the first years of the Lease for purchase and use by 
Arambel should Arambel so elect. 
The Trial Court found that the Lease had never been terminated 
(Finding of Fact No. 6), and that Arambel had defaulted on the 
Lease by failure to pay the monthly payments and to keep the 
improvements on the premises in good order (Finding of Fact No. 7) . 
The Court found that Arambel was obligated on the Lease for one (1) 
year after he quit making payments, making a total of $19,200.00 
plus interest due on the Lease for that year and that Arambel had 
damaged the Leased Premises beyond normal wear to the extent of 
$5,980.00 plus interest (Findings of Fact No's. 10 and 11). The 
Court also found that the Jones had a continuing expectation that 
Arambel would return to and use the Leased Premises and for this 
reason did not relet the premises and that that expectation on the 
Jones part was reasonable but not for a period exceeding one (1) 
12 
year from the date of the initial breach (Findings of Fact No. 9) . 
In its Second Memorandum Decision the Court held that reasonable 
mitigation efforts by Jones should have produced an alternate 
lessee within one (1) year from the breach and that the breach 
occurred on July 1 of 1992. (Second Memorandum Decision). 
That Arambel damaged the Leased Premises beyond normal use is 
apparently not contested by Arambel and Arambel does not, in his 
Brief, contest these damages as found by the Trial Court. Indeed, 
in the Conclusion to his Brief, Arambel asks that the Judgment of 
the Court be reduced to the amount of these damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In Point I of his brief, Arambel challenges the finding 
of the Court as being not supported by the evidence. Jones' 
argument on the point is that in order to challenge a finding of 
the Trial Court, the party making the challenge must marshall the 
evidence supporting the finding and then show that the evidence as 
marshalled does not support the finding and that the finding is 
therefor "clearly erroneous." Because Arambel has not met the 
marshalling requirement, his attack on the Court's finding must 
fail and the finding be affirmed by this Court. 
2. In Point II of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones 
elected to accept his surrender of the Leased Premises, thereby 
terminating the Lease. Jones' arguments on this point are that 
Jones did not elect to accept Arambel's surrender of the Leased 
Premises but rather treated the Lease as a continuing obligation 
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and sued for performance of the Lease. The Court found the Lease 
had not been terminated and there was evidence supporting the 
finding the Lease had not been terminated. Arambel failed to 
marshall the evidence in support of this finding of the Court and 
to show the finding was "clearly erroneous." For these reasons the 
Trial Court's finding that the Lease had not been terminated was 
not "clearly erroneous." 
3. In Point III of his brief, Arambel argues that the Trial 
Court erred in not finding that Jones elected to accept Arambel's 
surrender of the Leased Premises. Jones' argument on this point is 
that whether there is an acceptance by a lessor of a lessees 
surrender of leased premises is a question of fact, that in making 
a finding of fact the Court has broad discretion and those findings 
should be upheld absent a showing they were "clearly erroneous." 
By finding that the Lease had never been terminated, the Court 
found Jones had not elected, either expressly or by a course of 
conduct, to accept Arambel's surrender of the Leased Premises. 
Arambel has failed to meet the marshalling requirement and shown 
that the Court's finding the Lease had not been terminated was 
"clearly erroneous." 
4. In Point IV of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones had 
a duty to mitigate his damages under Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Company, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). The arguments of 
Jones on this are that that duty to mitigate did not arise when 
Arambel ceased making Lease payments in July of 19 92 under the 
particular facts of this case. Further, that even if that duty did 
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arise, Jones took reasonable action to mitigate their damages and 
that the Court's finding that this obligation to mitigate arose 
after one (1) year from the date of the original breach was, under 
the facts of this case, reasonable. 
5. In Point V of his brief, Arambel argues that Jones are 
not entitled to attorney's fees because Arambel successfully 
defended Jones claim by Arambel's defense of failure by Jones to 
mitigate their damages. The argument of Jones on this point is 
that Arambel did not prove his defense of Jones' claims, either in 
the Trial Court or, for the reasons cited in Arguments I through IV 
of this brief, before this Court; that therefore this Court's 
finding the Lease was not terminated is correct, the lease 
provision for attorney's fees applies and the Court's award of 
attorney's fees to Jones is also correct. Further, that Jones 
should be awarded their attorney's fees on this appeal and the case 
should be remanded to the Trial Court to fix the amount of those 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARAMBEL'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
BY ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE MUST FAIL BY REASON OF ARAMBEL'S FAILURE TO 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF SAID FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND THEN SHOWING THE QUESTIONED FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Under Point I of his brief, Arambel attacks the Trial Court's 
Finding of Fact No. 9 that Jones "... had a continuing expectation 
that Defendant would return to the leased premises." 
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When challenging a finding of fact made by a trial court, 
appellate courts will not address the challenge unless the 
appellant has properly marshalled the evidence supporting the 
finding and shown that the finding is so lacking in support that it 
is clearly erroneous. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176 (Utah 
1989). In the case of Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. 
App. 1993) the Court, citing Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d at 467 (Utah 1989) stated: 
"As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on 
findings of fact, appellant must marshall all evidence in 
support of the findings and demonstrate "That the 
evidence, including all reasonable inference drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings...." 
And in the case of Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, (Utah App. 
1994), this court held that in order to successfully challenge a 
trial courts findings of fact an appellant must marshall evidence 
in support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite the 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous. 
Arambel has not met this marshalling requirement. In order to 
meet this burden, Arambel must first list all evidence supporting 
the finding that is challenged. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 
P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1993) . Arambel has failed to do this. Rather, 
Arambel sites to the Court (without citation to the record) facts 
favorable to his view of the evidence which tend to show the 
questioned finding is not supported by the evidence. No facts are 
set forth in support of the questioned finding. 
16 
If an appellant fails to properly marshall the evidence, 
appellate courts must assume the findings are correct. Alta Indus. 
Ltd v. Hurst, supra. 
Because Arambel failed to marshall the evidence in support of 
Finding of Fact No. 7, his attack on that Finding must fail and the 
Finding be affirmed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE JONES DID NOT 
ELECT TO ACCEPT THE APPELLANT'S SURRENDER OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES AND THEREBY TERMINATE THE LEASE. 
Assuming arguendo that Arambel ever surrendered the Leased 
Premises to Jones, the earliest that surrender occurred was in 
December of 1992. Arambel moved his cows off the Leased Premises 
in August or September of 1991 (T. p. 31 Is. 15-20). His tenant 
moved out of the house on the Leased Premises in October or 
November of 1992 (T. p. 52 Is. 17-22). Arambel moved the last of 
his haylage from the Leased Premises in December of 1992 (T. p. 25 
Is. 12-20). 
These acts of Arambel in removing cattle, tenants and haylage 
from the Leased Premises do not prove a surrender of the Leased 
Premises. Rather they show a continuing intent by Arambel to 
retain the Leased Premises over a period of at lease six (6) months 
after he quit making Lease payments. The Trial Court found that 
Jones always had the expectation that Arambel would return to the 
Leased Premises and that this expectation was reasonable (Findings 
of Fact No. 9) . The Court had evidence in the form of Mr. Jones' 
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testimony, which the Court obviously chose to believe, in support 
of this Finding. Mr. Jones testified: 
Q. All right. And when did you realize that Mr. 
Arambel had left the premises and was not intendent (sic) 
of coming back? 
A. I contend that he could have come back at any 
time and used those premises. I had -- That's why I kept 
the, I did not let any other person in or was not 
interested in leasing it. 
Q. When did you realize though that Mr. Arambel 
abandoned those premises? 
A. I didn't think he -- It was his right to keep 
those premises until '94. He moved his cows in 
September. He kept dry cows there for a period of time 
and he couldn't make the dry cows and other things that 
he was going to do with the premises work so he removed 
the dry cows after October or November. 
Q. When you did not receive payment in July of 
1992, was it at that point that you believe that Mr. 
Arambel had abandoned the premises? 
A. I have never thought that Mr. Arambel had 
abandoned the premises. He had a right to come back to 
those premises at any time and use them for whatever 
purpose he wanted to. 
(T. p. 88 Is. 22-25 and T. p. 89 Is. 1-19.) 
More importantly, Jones allowed Arambel to pay off the 
Contract before its maturity. The inducement for Jones to allow 
this premature pay off was Arambel's promise to continue the Lease 
in effect. Mr. Jones testified: 
Q. Anything said in this conversation about the 
lease? 
A. And when we were talking about this I said, I 
stated that he realized that it was imperative that the 
lease agreement would continue even if he moved the cows. 
And I stated at that time how, or I asked him how he 
figured, how he calculated that he could pay a lease 
agreement with not receiving any value from it, not 
having any livestock or making use of the barns or 
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anything. And he said well, it's more efficient for him 
to have the cows in one place and be able to do that, he 
can make that up. And so that he could make that up 
better than to have them in two places. And I said well, 
no matter what I have to receive the lease payment on 
that leased property because it was included in it and if 
you want to move the, if you want to remove the cows, the 
lease agreement has to continue. And he agreed to that. 
T. p. 29 Is. 12-25 and T. p. 30 Is. 1-5. 
And Mrs. Jones testified: 
"Q. You were awarei that as part of the negotiations 
for the payoff of the cows and the right to remove the 
cows, the lease was to continue, the payments on the 
lease agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that arrangement inducement or one of 
the inducements to you to allow the cows to be paid off 
and moved? 
A. It was the one thing that I kept stressing that 
he had to keep paying the lease arrangement because that 
was the income that we were planning on using. 
Q. Would you have permitted the cows to be paid 
off and moved off the premises if the lease was not going 
to continue and had been cancelled? 
A. Never, no. 
These three (3) items from the Jones' testimony gave the Trial 
Court a basis for its finding that "... Plaintiffs had a continuing 
expectation that Defendant would return to and use the leased 
premises ..." and that "... This expectation on the Plaintiff's 
part was reasonable ..." (Finding of Fact No. 9) . 
Arambel quotes from the default clause (Lease, paragraph 
17(b)) (see page 17 of Arambel brief) wherein two (2) alternative 
remedies on default are set forth. The first was to terminate the 
Lease. There is no evidence that Jones took any action to 
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terminate the Lease and the Court expressly found that "... the 
lease is valid and enforceable and has never been terminated or 
modified by the parties, either specifically or by a course of 
dealincr between Plaintiff and Defendant." (Finding of Fact No. 6) . 
The second remedy cited by Arambel is for Jones to take 
possession of the Leased Premises and relet the same. There is no 
evidence that Jones exercised this option. Rather, Jones 
considered the Lease in effect and sued to collect the payments 
thereon (see Plaintiff's Complaint and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) . 
In other words, Appellees elected to specifically enforce the 
Lease, a remedy available to Jones under the laws of the State of 
Utah. In this regard, Jones point out to the Court that Arambel 
selectively quoted from the default clause in the Lease and omitted 
the following provision in the same clause: 
"The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and Lessor 
shall have as remedies cumulative to those provided above 
any and all remedies against Lessee provided by the laws 
of the State of Utah." (Lease, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, 
paragraph 17.) 
The contention at page 18 of Arambel's brief that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees elected to take possession of the Leased 
Premises and relet the same, is not supported by the record and is 
contrary to the express finding of the Trial Court and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
Without repeating the argument in Point I of this Brief, the 
argument thereon marshalling the evidence applies to Arambel's 
attack on the Court's finding that the Lease had never been 
terminated "... either specifically of by a course of dealing 
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between Plaintiff and Defendant." (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
Arambel never marshalled the evidence in support of the finding 
that the Lease had not been terminated at all. He is required to 
do this and then show that notwithstanding the evidence in support 
of the finding the finding is clearly erroneous. Wade, supra. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT JONES DID NOT ACCEPT 
ARAMBEL'S SURRENDER OF THE LEASED PREMISES AND WITHOUT 
SUCH ACCEPTANCE, THE LEASE IS NOT TERMINATED. 
In the case of John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 
279 P. 2d 700 (Ut. 1955), the Utah Supreme Court held (1) where 
there is no express agreement to abandon a lease the Tenant has 
the burden of establishing as an affirmative defense that such 
agreement was implied by the conduct of the parties, (2) a lease 
may be deemed surrendered only when the landlord exercises dominion 
over the leased premises which is inconsistent with the rights of 
the tenant, and (3) where a tenant surrenders leased premises 
whether the landlord accepbs the surrender is a question of 
intention to be determined from all the attendant circumstances, 
including conduct and intention of the parties. 
Arambel did not prove that Jones exercised dominion over the 
Leased Premises which was inconsistent with the rights of Arambel 
in the Leased Premises. In fact, any use of the Leased Premises by 
Jones was not adverse to Arambel's rights and was consistent (1) 
with the express agreement with Arambel for Jones to place heifers 
in a corral on the Leased Premises (T. pgs. 39-40); and (2) with 
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the past course of dealing between Jones and Arambel in mutual use 
of facilities, equipment and tools (T. p. 36 Is. 11-21, pgs. 37-38 
and p. 232 Is. 24-25 and p. 233). Jones' use of the Leased 
Premises was consistent with the historic joint use of the 
facilities and Jones made it clear that the Leased Premises were 
available to Arambel at all times (T. p. 89 Is. 1-19). 
The exercise of dominion such as would constitute acknowledg-
ment by Jones that Arambel had surrendered and Jones had accepted 
surrender of the Leased Premises was clearly a question of fact and 
in making a finding of fact the discretion of the Trial Court is 
broad and should be upheld absent a showing it was clearly 
erroneous. In order to assail this finding by the Trial Court, 
Arambel has the burden of showing the finding was clearly erroneous 
(Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and State of Utah v. Jose 
Carlos Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "... finding of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the Trial Court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. " And in Pena, supra, the court held that the 
clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to, the trial 
court's discretion because the witnesses and parties appear before 
the trial court and the evidence is presented there. 
Arambel has not marshalled any evidence in support of the 
Court's finding the Leased Premises had not been surrendered, much 
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less proved that that evidence shows the Court's finding to be 
clearly erroneous. 
The Trial Court found that the Lease had never been terminated 
(Finding of Fact No. 6) . Aranabel contends there were acts of Jones 
which demonstrated that Jones accepted the surrender of the Leased 
Premises and recited six (6) of those acts on pages 22 and 23 of 
his brief. However, the Trial Court rather than viewing the Jones 
acts as accepting the surrender of the Leased Premises viewed them 
as acts mitigating damages. The Court made this assessment after 
hearing the testimony and observing the witnesses. It was within 
the Court's discretion to make these findings and the findings 
should not be disturbed absent a showing by Arambel that they were 
clearly erroneous. No such showing has been made by Arambel. 
It is significant that Arambel makes no citation to the record 
of evidence to support his contention of Jones exercising dominion 
over the Leased Premises. On the other hand, the Court expressly 
found in its Memorandum Decision that Jones' action in using 
corrals and the hay barn and selling the home was to mitigate their 
damages (see Memorandum Decision). 
In addition, Arambel has not marshalled the evidence in 
support of the Court's finding that any exercise of dominion over 
the Leased Premises by Jones was to mitigate damage and were not 
inconsistent with Arambel's use of the Property. 
While Arambel surrendered the Leased Premises in December of 
1992, it is clear that Jones never intended to or did accept that 
surrender. Under Cutler, supra, Arambel had the burden of proving 
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acceptance of his surrender of the Leased Premises, and of proving 
Lessee exercised dominion over the Leased Premises inconsistent 
with a right as a tenant. As pointed out above, Arambel did not 
carry this burden. On the other hand, the finding by the Trial 
Court that the Lease had never been terminated was supported by 
substantial evidence, was not clearly erroneous and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
It is noted parenthetically that Arambel has taken inconsis-
tent position on the issue of whether the Lease was terminated 
before its expiration. On the one hand, Arambel does not contest 
that Jones were entitled to recover for damages to the Leased 
Premises (a right they could only have if the Lease had not been 
terminated). On the other hand, Arambel contends that the claimed 
surrender and acceptance of surrender by Jones terminated the Lease 
and Jones are not therefore entitled to lease payments. Arambel 
cannot have it both ways. Either the Lease was terminated or it 
was not. If it was not terminated so as to allow compensation for 
damage to the Leased Premises, it was not terminated for the 
purpose of collecting delinquent Lease payments. 
POINT IV 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
THAT JONES' EXPECTATION THAT ARAMBEL WOULD RETURN TO THE 
LEASED PREMISES WAS REASONABLE BUT NOT FOR A PERIOD OF 
ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE INITIAL BREACH BY ARAMBEL WAS 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The following facts are central to the Court's findings in 
this case: 
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1. Though Arambel stopped making lease payments after the 
June, 1992 payment, he continued to occupy the Leased Premises 
until he removed the last of this haylage in December, 1992. (T. 
p. 25 Is. 12-20) . 
2. The right of Arambel to pay off the Contract and remove 
the cows from the Leased Premises was expressly conditioned upon 
the Lease continuing for its term and but for Arambel's agreement 
to continue the Lease, Jones would not have allowed Arambel to pay 
off the Contract and move the cows. (T. p. 29 Is. 12-25, p. 30 
Is., 1-5, T. p. 31 Is. 9-14 and T. p. 168 Is. 7-22). 
3. Arambel was milking cows at another location and 
consolidating his milking operations at one site was an economic 
advantage to Arambel such that he considered it was worth 
continuing paying lease payments to obtain that advantage. (T. p. 
29 Is. 12-25 and p. 30 Is 1-5). 
4. By allowing Arambel to prepay the Contract, Jones 
suffered an economic disadvantage in the form of receiving less 
money on the Contract than they would have received had the 
Contract gone to term. A material inducement to Jones to accept 
this economic disadvantage was (1) accommodation of Arambel; and 
(2) the assurance that if prepayment of the Contract were 
permitted, the Lease would continue to term. (T. p. 31 Is. 9-14). 
Taking into account the foregoing, the Trial Court found that 
Jones "... had a continuing expectation that Defendant (Arambel) 
would return to and use the Leased Premises and for this reason 
failed to relet the Premises and thereby mitigating their damages." 
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However, the court added that although the expectation was 
reasonable, it would have been reasonable for Jones to find 
alternate ways of mitigating their damages after one (1) year from 
the initial breach. (Finding of Fact No. 9) . The Court found the 
initial breach consistent of failure to make lease payments for 
July, 1992 and thereafter and computed the damages to be the 
monthly payments of $1,600.00 times the one (1) year period to 
arrive at total damages of $19,200.00. (Finding of Fact No. 10). 
The Court did find that Jones had taken steps to mitigate their 
damages during said one (1) year period and found the mitigating 
efforts to total $3,650.00. (Finding of Fact No. 8). From this 
Finding, the Court subtracted $3,650.00 from $19,200.00 and entered 
judgment for the $15,550.00 plus interest. (Judgment and Decree, 
paragraph 1). The Court also found Arambel had damaged the Leased 
Premises beyond reasonable wear and awarded judgment on this count 
for $5,980.00. (Finding of Fact No.'s 7 and 11 and Judgment and 
Decree, paragraph 2). 
Arambel cites Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 776 
P. 2d 896, in support of his contention that Jones had a duty to 
mitigate their damages. Jones do not take issue with the rule of 
RejLd, supra. They submit that the facts of this case take it out 
of the strict application of that Rule. The Reid case involved a 
commercial lease. This case involves an agricultural lease with 
decidedly different facts. Specifically, the four (4) facts cited 
above and the fact that we are here dealing with agricultural 
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property. In Reid, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged there could 
be difference. It stated: 
"Obviously, the objective commercial reasonableness 
of mitigation efforts is a fact question that depends 
heavily on the particulars of the property and the 
relevant market at the pertinent point in time." Id. 
907. 
To impose on Jones a strict duty to mitigate is to allow 
Arambel to benefit from misleading Jones into allowing a pay off of 
the Contract, allowing Arambel to move his cows, reaping the 
benefit of moving the cows and then walking away from the Lease. 
Clearly, Jones expected the Lease to continue to term. Arambel had 
so represented and agreed as a condition which he understood and 
agreed to of his right to prepay the Contract. 
It should be equally cle>.ar that Jones should have no duty to 
mitigate their damages until Arambel had finally vacated the 
premises. This was in December of 1992 when he removed the last of 
his haylage from the Leased Premises. This was six (6) months 
after Arambel quit making lease payments. 
Jones did mitigate their damages to the extent of $3,650.00 
(Finding of Fact No. 8), and the Court deducted this amount from 
the one (1) years payments it found Arambel should pay. It is 
significant that the pay off received by Jones was $19,827.00 less 
than what Jones would have received on the Contract had it gone 
full term. And this amount is virtually equal to the one (1) 
year's lease payments the Court held Jones were entitled to. 
The foregoing facts auger against a finding that Jones should 
have begun efforts to relet the Leased Premises in July of 1992 and 
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in favor of the Trial Court's finding that a reasonable time when 
efforts should have yielded a replacement tenant was one (1) year 
after the last lease payment was made. For these reasons, the 
Jones submit that Reid, supra, should be factually distinguished in 
this case and the Finding and Decree of the Trial Court affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED JONES THEIR ATTORNEY 
FEES AND THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD JONES ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
THIS APPEAL. 
The Lease requires Arambel to pay $1,600.0 0 per month on the 
1st day of each month (Lease, paragraph 4) and to maintain the 
Leased Premises in their condition as at the beginning of the 
Lease, reasonable wear excepted (Lease, paragraph 6). The Court 
found that Arambel had breached both of these Lease provisions, the 
first by failing to make lease payments after June of 1992 and the 
second by failing to care for and maintain the improvements on the 
Leased Premises. (Finding of Fact No. 7). The Trial Court found 
the Lease had never been terminated. (Finding of Fact No. 6). 
This Finding has not been successfully assailed by Arambel on this 
appeal for the reasons argued under Points I, II and III in this 
brief. 
While Jones had the option to terminate the Lease, they never 
elected that option. Terminating the Lease was not Jones' only 
remedy on Arambel's default. The Lease provides for the remedy of 
termination and then states: 
f,The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and Lessor 
shall have as remedies cumulative to those provided 
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above, any and all remedies against Lessee provided by 
the laws of the State of Utah." (Lease, paragraph 17, 
last sentence). 
Jones elected the remedy of specific performance and sued for 
lease payments due and for damages to the Leased Premises. 
(Plaintiff's Complaint and Amendment, R. 3, 4 and 31) . This remedy 
is clearly available to Jones under the laws of the State of Utah 
and was therefore a remedy provided for in the Lease. 
Paragraph 19 of the Lease states: 
"19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. That should either 
of the parties default in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the leased 
premises or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or 
by the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy is 
pursued by filing of suit or otherwise." 
Because the Lease was never terminated, Plaintiff's action was 
to enforce its provisions. Enforcement of the Lease was an 
available remedy to Jones. The Lease provides for payment of 
attorney's fees, the Trial Court correctly held Jones were entitled 
to recover their attorney's fees. Arambel does not contest the 
amount of the attorney's fees and the award of attorney's fees in 
the amount of $5,305.23 should be affirmed. (Judgment and Decree, 
paragraph 3). 
Jones' have been required to defend this appeal. The appeal 
arises from Jones' effort to enforce the Lease and under the terms 
of the Lease, Jones' are entitled to recover their attorney's fees 
for defending Arambel's appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of the Trial Court in the amount of $19,200.00 
for delinquent rent, offset by Jones' mitigation should be 
affirmed. That Judgment is supported by the evidence. Arambel has 
not marshalled the evidence in favor of the findings on which that 
judgment is buttressed and shown they were clearly erroneous. In 
addition, under the facts of this case, the Court's holding that 
Jones' duty to mitigate did not arise until after July of 1993 is 
fair and reasonable and results only in partially compensating 
Jones for their loss resulting from allowing Arambel to prepay the 
Contract. The Judgment in the amount of $5,980.00 plus interest 
for damage to the Leased Premises has not been contested and should 
be affirmed. If the Court affirms the Judgment of the Trial Court 
on other counts, its judgment for attorney's fees should be 
affirmed. Likewise, if the Judgment of the Trial Court is 
affirmed, this Court should award Jones their attorney's fees for 
this appeal and remand to the District Court to determine the 
amount of such judgment. 
DATED this 12th day of August, 1996. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
30 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) exact copies of the 
Appellee's Brief, to be mailed to Defendant/Appellant's Attorney, 
Gregory N. Skabelund, at 2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84341, 
postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 12th day of August, 1996. 
LBH/ct 
3ones brf 
N-4213 
Addendum 
Lease 
Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 
LEASE 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT, made and entered into on the 21st day 
of August, 1989, by and between NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES S. 
JONES of Newton, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
Lessor, and MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL of North Logan, Cache County, Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as Lessee, 
WITNESSETH: 
1. Leased Premises. The Lessor, for the term and upon the 
provisions and conditions hereinafter set forth, hereby leases to 
the Lessee, and the Lessee, on said provisions and conditions and 
for said term, hereby leases from the Lessor, the milking parlor, 
milking equipment therein, two (2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging 
sheds, corrals, silo, commodity shed and tenant house situated upon 
the real property in Newton, Utah described as follows: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 14, as platted on Plat "A" of Newton 
Townsite Survey, and further described as being situated 
in Sections 18 and 19, Township 13 North, Range 1 West 
of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
including the real property on which the aforesaid improvements are 
situated, the real property adjacent to said improvements which are 
used in connection with said facilities, the right by means 
established as of the date of this Lease of ingress and egress to 
said facilities, and the following farm machinery 
One (1) A26 International Tractor with Feed Wagon; 
One (1) Ford 545 Tractor with Scraper and Loader; 
One (1) Gehl Grain Chopper; 
One (1) Ford Truck with Manure Box; and 
One (1) Knight Manure Spreader. 
The property subject of this Lease will be referred to hereafter 
as the -leased premisesH. 
2. Term. The term of this Lease shall be five (5) years, 
beginning September 1, 1989 and terminating at midnight on August 
31, 1994. 
3. Use of Leased Premises. Concurrent with the execution and 
delivery of this Agreement, the Lessor as Seller is entering into 
a Contract of Sale ("the Contract") for the sale of 180 Cows (Mthe 
CowsH) and 6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base ("the Base") in Western 
Dairymans Cooperative, Inc. (MWDCIH) to Lessee as Buyer. It is 
expressly agreed that Lessee will keep the Cows on the property 
constituting a part of the leased premises at all times during the 
term of this Agreement and at no other location until the Contract 
and this Lease are completely performed by Lessee. Lessee further 
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covenants and agrees to use and maintain the leased premises and 
the Cows and Base as an integrated Grade A dairy facility during 
the term of this Lease and for no other purpose. To this end, 
Lessee agrees to comply with every rule and regulation applicable 
to Grade A dairy facilities in Cache County, Utah. 
4. Consideration. Lessee agrees to pay Lessor for use of the 
leased premises the sum of $1,600.00 per month in lawful money of 
the United States of America on the first day of each month during 
the term of this Lease, beginning October 1, 1989 and run through 
and including September 1, 1994. On any payment due hereunder 
which is not made on the due date thereof or within ten (10) days 
thereafter, Lessee agrees to pay a late charge of five percent (5%) 
of the unpaid amount of such installment to cover the additional 
expense of handling such delinquent payment or payments. Said late 
charges shall be paid with and in addition to the delinquent amount 
of the payment on which charged when made and as a condition to 
Lessor accepting such late payments. 
5. Milk Assignment. Lessee agrees, concurrent herewith, to 
execute and deliver to Lessor an assignment of One Thousand Six 
Hundred Dollars ($1,600.00) each month from the proceeds of 
Lessee's sale of milk to WDCI. Said assignment shall begin with 
the milk check payable to Lessee on October 1, 1989 and shall be 
maintained and retained in full force and effect without 
modification as to date, amount or otherwise until all 
consideration payable under this Lease has been paid in full and 
Lessee has complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of 
this Lease. 
6. Care and Maintenance. Lessee agrees to care for and to 
maintain the improvements constituting a part of the leased 
premises and all equipment constituting a part of the leased 
premises in their condition as at the beginning of this Lease, 
reasonable wear excepted. Lessee covenants and agrees to promptly 
repair in a workmanlike manner all damage to improvements and all 
equipment constituting a part of the leased premises at Lessee's 
sole cost and expense. 
7. Payment of Utilities. All culinary water and electricity 
used on and in connection with Lessee's use of the leased premises 
shall be separately metered and shall be paid for by Lessee 
promptly when due. 
8. Continuous Occupancy Required. Subject only to the 
conditions provided in paragraph 10 herein, Lessee shall not leave 
the leased premises unoccupied or vacant but shall continuously, 
during the entire term of this Lease, conduct and carry on only the 
type of business with and on the leased premises specifically set 
forth in paragraph 3 of this Lease. 
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9. Real Property Taxes and Insurance. Lessor shall pay the 
real property taxes on the leased premises during the term of this 
Agreement, In addition, Lessor shall provide and pay the premium 
for fire and general hazard insurance on improvements constituting 
a part of the leased premises and shall be the sole beneficiary of 
such insurance. Lessee shall be responsible for obtaining and 
paying for fire and general hazard insurance on the Cows, any feed 
of Lessee kept on the leased premises, and any and all personal 
property of Lessee kept on the leased premises. Lessee shall, 
during the term of this Lease, carry public liability insurance 
covering the leased premises with single limits of not less than 
Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) for injury and/or 
death to persons and damage to property in companies licensed to 
do business in the State of Utah rated "A" or better, Class X by 
Best Key Rating Guide or any like rating service, pay the premiums 
therefor, and deliver certificates of such insurance to Lessor from 
time to time during the term of this Lease. Lessor shall be named 
as an additional named insured on such policy. The failure of 
Lessee to procure such insurance and pay the requisite premiums 
therefor, to name Lessor as an insured party thereon, or to deliver 
said policies or certificates or duplicates to Lessor, shall 
authorize, but not require Lessor to procure such insurance and 
pay the requisite premiums therefor, which premiums shall be 
repayable to Lessor with the next installment of rent. Each 
insurer under the policies required hereunder shall agree by 
endorsement on the policy issued by it or by independent instrument 
furnished to Lessor that it will give Lessor no less than thirty 
(30) days written notice before the policy in question shall be 
altered or cancelled. 
10. Manure Removal. The parties shall cooperate in manure 
removal from the leased premises. Such removal shall be 
accomplished by Lessee or his agents at the times and in the manner 
directed by Lessor. All manure produced by the Cows shall be 
applied to land owned by Lessor unless Lessor otherwise directs. 
11. Abatement of Consideration. In the event any buildings 
constituting a part of the leased premises are destroyed or damaged 
as a result of causes other than acts or neglect of Lessee and such 
damage or destruction results in a diminution in but not a complete 
inability of Lessee's ability to conduct a Grade A Dairy operation 
with not less than 180 Cows on the leased premises, the monthly 
consideration for this Lease shall be reduced by an amount 
proportionate to the reduction in Lessee's cow herd below 180 Cows 
as compared with 180 Cows for the period between such damage or 
destruction and the time the same are repaired or replaced. Lessor 
shall be responsible for repairing and/or replacing such damaged 
or destroyed buildings. If all buildings constituting a part of 
the leased premises are completely destroyed as a result of causes 
other than acts or neglect of Lessee to the point where Lessee 
cannot conduct a Grade HAH dairy on the leased premises, then 
either party may, on written notice to the other within ten (10) 
4 
days after such destruction, terminate this Lease, and in the event 
such notice is given, both parties shall be released from all 
obligations hereunder, except obligations accrued to the date of 
such destruction- However, Lessee's obligation on the Contract 
shall continue in full force and effect and shall in no way be 
modified or affected by any destruction. If no such notice is 
given, the destroyed premises shall be rebuilt by Lessor as 
expeditiously as possible. Rentals herein provided shall abate 
until the destroyed improvements are rebuilt and shall thereupon 
resume for the unexpired portion of the term of this Lease. Under 
no circumstances shall this Lease be modified in any way if damage 
to or destruction of any such buildings result from the acts or 
neglect of Lessee, his agents or employees. 
12. Default on the Contract. A default on the Contract shall 
constitute a default on this Lease and shall make available to 
Lessor all remedies on default provided in the Contract and in this 
Lease. 
13. Payment of Expenses. Lessee agrees to furnish all labor 
and to pay expenses of every kind and nature for the operation and 
maintenance of the leased premises and for the conducting of 
Lessee's operations thereon. 
14. Assignment. Lessee shall not assign this Lease or any 
of his right or interest herein or sub-lease any part of the leased 
premises for any purpose whatever without the prior written consent 
of Lessor. Any assignment or sub-letting by Lessee without 
Lessor's consent shall be null and void and shall constitute a 
breach of this Lease by Lessee. 
15. Surrender of Possession. Lessee will surrender 
possession of the leased premises on July 31, 1994, and that any 
holding over thereafter shall be construed to be a tenancy at will. 
16. Financing Statement. Lessee agrees to execute and 
deliver one or more financing 'statements, supplements thereto and 
extensions thereof or other instruments as Lessor may from time to 
time require to comply with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, or 
other applicable law to preserve, protect, and enforce the security 
interest of the Lessor in said leased premises, and Lessee agrees 
to pay all costs of filing such statement, supplements, extensions 
or instruments. 
17. Default and Remedies. The Lessee shall be in default on 
this Lease upon the happening of one or more of the following 
events: 
(a) Failure to pay an installment of rent or any 
other sums to be paid by Lessee hereunder when due or 
within ten (10) days thereafter; 
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(b) Failure to perform any terra, provision or 
condition of this Lease; 
(c) A petition under any provision of bankruptcy 
law is filed against or by Lessee, or an assignment is 
made by Lessee for the benefit of Lessee's creditors, or 
a receiver is appointed of any assets covered by this 
Lease and/or by the Contract; 
(d) Failure of Lessee to perform any terra, provision 
or condition of the Contract. 
Upon default by the Lessee, Lessor may elect to terminate this 
Lease or without terminating this Lease Lessor may take possession 
of the leased premises and relet the same or any part thereof for 
such term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon such 
other terms and conditions as Lessor, in the exercise of Lessor's 
sole discretion, may deem advisable, and shall have the right to 
make alterations and repairs to said leased premises. Upon each 
such reletting, Lessee shall be immediately liable for and shall 
pay to Lessor any indebtedness then due hereunder, the costs and 
expenses of such reletting, (including advertising costs) brokerage 
fees and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Lessor, the cost 
of alterations and repairs incurred by Lessor, and the amount of 
any rent accrued under this Lease for the period up to the time of 
reletting and thereafter to the end of the term of this Lease, less 
the rent actually received from reletting the leased premises. If 
Lessee has been credited with any rent to be received by such 
reletting and such rents shall not be promptly paid to Lessor by 
the new Lessee, such deficiency shall be calculated and paid 
monthly by Lessee. The foregoing remedy is not exclusive, and 
Lessor shall have as remedies cumulative to those provided above 
any and all remedies against Lessee provided by the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
18. Improvements. Any improvements placed on the leased 
premises by Lessee during the term of this Lease shall revert to 
and become the property of Lessor at the termination of this Lease, 
free and clear of any claim by Lessee and without the payment by 
Lessor of any consideration therefor. 
19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. That should either of the 
parties default in any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the 
leased premises or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing of suit or otherwise. 
20. Notices. Any notice required hereunder or which may be 
required in pursuing any remedy given by the laws of the State of 
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Utah to the parties hereto shall be deemed sufficient if given by 
registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as 
follows: 
To Lessor: 107 West 200 South 
Newton, Utah 84327 
To Lessee: 1736 North 1850 East 
North Logan, Utah 84321 
Said addresses may be changed at any time by giving written notice 
to the other party. 
21. Right of Entry. Lessor reserves the right to themselves, 
their agents, their employees, or their assigns, to enter the 
leased premises at any reasonable time for purposes (a) of 
consultation with Lessee; (b) of making repairs and improvements; 
and (3) of inspections of the leased premises. 
22. Compliance With Law and Insurance Limitations. Lessee 
agrees in his occupancy and use of the leased premises to comply 
with all applicable rules, regulations, allotments or other 
conditions imposed by federal, state, county or municipal 
authority, and will conduct his operations on the leased premises 
in accordance therewith. Lessee agrees to hold Lessor free from 
all liability, cost or expenses of any kind that may be incurred 
by reason of Lessee's failure or neglect so to do. In addition, 
Lessee agrees to comply with all rules, conditions and limitations 
in his use and occupancy of the leased premises imposed by the 
terms, provisions and conditions of fire and general hazard 
insurance policies obtained by Lessor on any improvements 
constituting a part of the leased premises. 
23. Indemnification. Lessee agrees to indemnify Lessor and 
hold Lessor harmless from loss, damages, demands and claims of 
every kind for injuries to or death of persons and from injury or 
damage to property arising from or upon the leased premises. The 
amount of this indemnification shall not be limited to the 
liability insurance limits provided in paragraph 8 of this Lease, 
but Lessee shall be liable under this provision for all claims 
herein indemnified against, whether or not greater than or covered 
by the coverage provisions by such liability insurance. Lessee 
expressly agrees that indemnification under this provision shall 
include all investigation, defense and other costs and all 
attorney's fees incurred by Lessor in enforcing this provision and 
in defending themselves against any and all claims against which 
Lessors are indemnified under and pursuant to this provision. 
24. Multiple Parties. As used in this Lease, the terra Lessor 
shall include all Lessors, whether one or more; and the masculine 
shall include the feminine and the feminine the masculine when the 
context so requires. 
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25. Applicable Law and Venue. This Lease shall be governed 
and construed under and according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
All actions to enforce or construe this Lease shall be brought and 
maintained in the District Court of Cache County, Utah, and in no 
other court, and all parties expressly consent to and submit 
themselves to the venue and jurisdiction of said Court. 
26. Parties Bound. The terms of this Lease shall be binding 
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their 
respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, trustees 
and permitted assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands 
on the day and year first above written. 
Delores S. Jones 
LESSOR 
W i t n e s s 
VWJUSL V. Q U ^ ^ S L ^ 
M i c h a e l J . Ar 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s 
County of Cache ) 
On the 21st day of August, 1989, personally appeared before 
me NORVAL R. JONES, DELORES S. JONES and MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, the 
signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
the\y executed the same. 
s*?*&L,jtA ^ C - ^ ^ < 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t : Logar , 
Commiss ion E x p i r e s : b / 1 5 / 9 1 
n^yjferah 
• ^ r 
LBH/1 
j o n e s . l e a 
Contract 
Plaintiff s 
Exhibit 2 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
THIS CONTRACT, made and entered into this 21st day of August, 
1989, by and between NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES S. JONES of 
Newton, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter referred to as Seller, and 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL of North Logan, Cache County, Utah, hereinafter 
referred to as Buyer. 
WITNESSETH: 
1. Property Sold. For the consideration and on the terms and 
conditions herein set forth, the Seller agrees to sell and the 
Buyer agrees to purchase the following described property: 
One Hundred Eighty (180) head of Holstein Milk Cows (-the 
Cows") 
6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base ( Mthe Base") in Western 
Dairymans Cooperative, Inc. (HWDCI") 
2. Herd Size. It Is understood that the Cows constitute all 
of Seller's herd of milking cows, including milking and dry cows, 
and that in the event there are insufficient Cows on the date of 
possession hereinafter provided to make a total of One Hundred 
Eighty (180) Holstein Milk Cows, Seller will on the date of 
possession provide sufficient "springing" heifers from Seller's 
non-milking herd, of Buyer's choice, to bring the total number of 
Cows to One Hundred Eighty (180) head on the date of possession. 
3. Branding, Identification and Maintaining of Herd Numbers. 
The Cows shall be branded with a on the right hip on or 
before the date of closing. Buyer agrees to maintain a herd of not 
less than One Hundred Eighty (180) Holstein Milk Cows, milking and 
dry, at all times during the term of this Contract. As the Cows 
delivered to Buyer on the date of possession die or are culled and 
sold, Buyer agrees to replace each cow which dies or is culled and 
sold with a Holstein cow or springing Holstein heifer ( -Replacement 
Cows") of comparable quality to the one replaced. Each Replacement 
Cow shall immediately be branded with the above-described brand in 
the above-described body location. Title to all Replacement Cows 
shall vest in Seller as security for Buyer's performance of all 
terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract. Until this 
Contract is fully performed by Buyer, Seller shall have and is 
hereby granted a security interest in all Cows and all Replacement 
Cows to secure Buyer's performance of all terms, provisions and 
conditions of this Contract. 
4. Liens and Encumbrances. Seller warrants and represents 
that the Cows are free of all liens and encumbrances. Buyer agrees 
that he will not place or allow the placement of any liens or 
encumbrances against the Cows or the Replacement Cows or against 
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title thereto until after Buyer has performed as herein provided 
all terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract. All 
Replacement Cows shall be paid for in full when purchased or 
otherwise acquired by Buyer and used as such replacements, and 
Replacement Cows shall be and remain free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances until after Buyer has performed as herein provided 
all terms, provisions and conditions of this Contract. 
5. Purchase Price, Allocation and Payment. The purchase 
price is Two Hundred Seven Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($207,600.00). The purchase price shall be and is allocated as 
follows: 
To the Cows $180,000.00 
To the Base $ 27,600.00 
Buyer agrees to pay the purchase price to Seller or the order of 
Seller in writing at the residence of Seller at 107 West 200 South, 
Newton, Utah 84327, or at such other place as Seller may designate 
in writing, in lawful money of the United States of America, as 
follows: 
(a) $4,750.00 on October 15, 1989, and $4,750.00 on 
the 15th day of each month thereafter until the entire 
purchase price, together with interest as hereinafter 
provided, is paid in full. 
(b) On any payment due hereunder which is not made 
on the due date thereof or within ten (10) days 
thereafter, the Buyer agrees to pay a late charge of five 
percent (5%) of the unpaid amount of such installment to 
cover the additional expense of handling such delinquent 
payment or payments. Said late charges shall be and aire 
secured by the security interest in the Cows, Replacement 
Cows and Base granted by this Contract and shall be paid 
with and in addition to the delinquent amount of the 
payment on which charged when made and as a condition to 
Seller accepting such late payments. 
6. Interest. Seller agrees to pay interest on all unpaid 
principal portions of the purchase price from September 1, 1989 at 
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Each payment made by 
Buyer shall be applied as follows: First to late charges, if any, 
second to interest accrued to the date of receipt of payment by 
Seller, and third to principal. Buyer may not prepay any part of 
the purchase price or interest thereon without the prior written 
consent of Seller and then only on such terms and conditions as 
Seller may specify in writing in advance of any permitted payment. 
7. Milk Assignment. Buyer agrees, concurrent herewith, to 
execute and deliver to Seller an assignment of Four Thousand Seven 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,750.00) each month from the proceeds of 
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Buyer's sale of milk to WDCI. Said assignment shall begin with the 
milk check payable to Buyer on October 15, 1989 and shall be 
maintained and retained in full force and effect without 
modification as to date, amount or otherwise until all 
consideration payable under this Contract has been paid in full and 
Buyer has complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of 
this Contract. 
8. Place of Keeping. The Cows and all Replacement Cows shall 
at all times until this Contract is completed be kept on the 
premises commonly known as 107 West 200 South in Newtonf Utah. 
None of the Cows or Replacement Cows shall be removed from the 
above location except when dead or removed for purposes of culling 
or sale with Seller's permission as hereinafter provided. 
9. Culling and Sale. Buyer shall have the right to cull and 
sell any of the Cows and Replacement Cows on the following express 
conditions: 
(a) Buyer shall first seek and obtain the written 
consent of Seller to the culling and sale of each Cow and 
Replacement Cow. 
(b) The full proceeds from sale of any Cow and 
Replacement Cow and any from the sale of any cow carcass 
sold shall be paid to Seller and shall be applied on the 
purchase price in the manner provided in paragraph 6 
above, unless Seller otherwise agrees in writing. The 
proceeds so paid and applied shall be additional payments 
to those provided in paragraph 5(a) herein and not as a 
part of or in lieu of any such payment. 
(c) Concurrent with the execution and delivery of 
this Contract, Buyer agrees to execute, acknowledge and 
deliver to Seller an Assignment from the proceeds of 
Buyer's sale of milk to WDCI of sums sufficient to pay 
the monthly payments to Seller provided in this Contract 
and in the Lease. Such Assignment shall be irrevocable 
and shall take precedence over all other such assignments 
until this Contract has been fully performed by Buyer. 
The making and giving of such Assignment shall not 
constitute payment by Buyer on this Contract or on the 
Lease, and no credits for payments shall be given by 
Seller until actually received by Seller. Said 
Assignment shall in no way release or modify Buyer's 
obligation to make the payments herein provided promptly 
and in the amounts provided, and if sums from such 
Assignment are insufficient to pay each payment herein 
and in the Lease when due, Buyer shall be and remain 
fully responsible for and shall pay any deficiency when 
due. 
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Seller specifically agrees to allow Buyer to use the proceeds from 
the sale of all Cows and Replacement Cows culled, sold, and the 
proceeds from sale of all cow carcasses to apply toward purchase 
of Replacement Cows. If sale proceeds are so used by Buyer, no 
amounts so used by Buyer shall be applied toward payment of the 
purchase price. 
10. Security in Base. Notwithstanding the assignment 
provided in paragraph 12 herein, Seller shall have and hereby 
retains a security interest in the Base and in all increase thereon 
which may accrue during the term of this Contract to secure Buyer's 
timely performance of all terms, provisions and conditions of this 
Contract. Buyer agrees to increase the number of cows he milks in 
conjunction with the Cows sold hereunder to a total, including the 
180 Cows sold hereunder, of 210 adult, milking cows or "springing 
heifersH not later than September 1, 1990* Buyer's failure so to 
do shall not constitute a default under this Contract. However, 
in the event Buyer complies with this provision, then (1) upon 
Buyer providing Seller with evidence satisfactory to Seller that 
title to the additional 30 head of cows or springing heifers is 
free and clear of all encumbrances, (2) upon Buyer's execution and 
delivery to Seller of a UCC-1 (Financing Statement on said 
additional 30 head of cows or springing heifers), and (3) provided 
doing so will not reduce the number of pounds of WDCI Grade A Milk 
Base which Seller is selling hereunder below 6900 pounds, Seller 
agrees to release their lien and security interest against the Base 
and to accept the security interest in said 30 additional head of 
cows or springing heifers as substitute security for the Base. If 
any of the conditions (1), (2) or (3) in this paragraph 10 fail, 
this provision for substitution of security of 30 head of cows or 
springing heifers for the Base shall be inoperative, and Seller 
shall retain a security interest in the Base pursuant to this 
paragraph 10 until the purchase price is paid in full and Buyer has 
complied with all terms, provisions and conditions of this 
Contract. 
11. Financing Statement. Buyer agrees to execute and deliver 
one or more financing statements, supplements thereto and 
extensions thereof or other instruments as Seller may from time to 
time require to comply with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, or 
other applicable law to preserve, protect, and enforce the security 
interest of the Seller in said personal property, and Buyer agrees 
to pay all costs of filing such statement, supplements, extensions 
or instruments. 
12. Assignment. Concurrent with the execution and delivery 
of this Contract, Seller agrees to assign to Buyer all of Seller's 
interest in the Base, subject to the security interest provided in 
paragraph 10 above. Said assignment shall be recorded with WDCI, 
and WDCI shall be informed of Seller's retained security interest 
in the Base. Buyer covenants and agrees that he will not assign 
or in any way encumber the Base until after this Contract has been 
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fully performed strictly within the terms and conditions of this 
Contract. 
13. Conveyance. Upon payment in full of the purchase price 
and Buyer's compliance with all terms, provisions and conditions 
of this Contract, Seller agrees (1) to convey title to the Cows 
and Replacement Cows to Buyer by Bill of Sale; and (2) to terminate 
with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code any and 
all financing statements filed pursuant to paragraph 11 of this 
Contract. Title to the Cows and Replacement Cows shall be conveyed 
free and clear of all liens, defects and encumbrances, except such 
liens, defects and encumbrances as might accrue against the Cows 
and Replacement Cows or against title thereto by reason of the acts 
or neglect of the Buyer. 
14. Care and Maintenance of Cows. From and after the date 
possession of the Cows is delivered to Buyer, Buyer shall assume 
and bear all risk of loss, disease, injury and death of and to the 
Cows and Replacement Cows. Buyer agrees to feed, care for and 
maintain the Cows and Replacement Cows in the same condition of 
health as when possession is delivered to Buyer and to provide and 
pay for all vaccination, dehorning, care and treatment of and for 
the Cows and Replacement Cows, including but not limited to payment 
of all medicine and veterinary fees and charges for care 
(preventive and corrective) and treatment of the Cows and 
Replacement Cows. In addition, Buyer agrees to breed the Cows in 
a timely manner so as to insure that each Cow bears a calf each 
year unless the Cow is barren or for a reason beyond the control 
of Buyer fails to conceive a calf. Buyer agrees to maintain good 
and sufficient record and accounts of all Cows and Replacement Cows 
and the milk production and offspring thereof, which will be 
available for inspection by Seller at any reasonable time. Buyer 
agrees to obey all laws and regulations pertaining to the 
ownership, possession and use of the Cows and Replacement Cows and 
particularly those laws pertaining to health, quarantine, herding, 
grazing, trespass, branding inspection, movement and transportation 
of livestock and that the marks or brands on the Cows and 
Replacement Cows shall not be altered or mutilated in any respect. 
In addition, Buyer agrees to comply with all rules and regulations 
of WDCI and to at all times during this Contract maintain not less 
than 6900 pounds of Grade A Milk Base with WDCI. 
15. Increase. Provided Buyer complies with the provisions 
of paragraph 3 of this Contract, all increase of and from the Cows 
and Replacement Cows shall be the property of Buyer. In the event 
Buyer defaults on this Contract, from and after the date of such 
default, all increase of and from the Cows and Replacement Cows 
which are born from and after the date of such default shall be and 
remain the property of Seller and shall be covered by and included 
as a part of the security interest retained by Seller in the Cows 
and Replacement Cows as fully as though and to the same extent as 
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if such security interest had attached to such increase at the 
inception of this Contract. 
16. Taxes. The sale and purchase represented by this 
Contract is believed by all parties hereto to be exempt from Utah 
Sales Tax. However, should any sales or use tax be assessed upon 
or as a result of the sale represented by this Contract, all such 
taxes shall be paid by Buyer. Any personal property taxes levied 
against the Cows and Replacement Cows during the time this Contract 
remains in effect shall be paid by Buyer. Any personal property 
taxes assessed against the Cows and Replacement Cows for the 
calendar year 1989 shall be prorated to August 1, 1989. Seller 
shall pay seven-twelfths (7/12) of such tax and Buyer five-twelfths 
(5/12) of such tax. Each shall pay their pro rata part of such 
personal property tax on or before the due date for payment 
thereof. 
17. Concurrent Lease. Concurrent with the execution and 
delivery of this Contract, the Seller as Lessor and Buyer as Lessee 
will enter into a written Lease ("the Lease-) of property and 
improvements in Newton, Utah whereon the Cows are presently being 
housed and kept. The Lease is an integral part of this transaction 
whereby the Cows and the Base are being sold to Buyer. It is, 
therefore, expressly understood and agreed that any default on the 
Lease will constitute a default on this Contract, and any such 
default on the Lease shall make available to Seller all remedies 
on default provided in this Contract as well as and in addition to 
all remedies provided in the Lease upon default by the Lessee. 
18. Inspection and Cure of Default. Seller may at all times 
enter upon the premises where any of the Cows and Replacement Cows 
may be found to inspect the same and, in Seller's sole discretion, 
correct any default of Buyer, and Seller may make such expenditures 
as Seller considers necessary or appropriate to correct any such 
default, whether for payment of taxes or for the care and 
protection of the Cows and Replacement Cows or of the security 
interest of Seller, or otherwise. Buyer, upon demand of Seller, 
will repay to Seller the amount of such expenditures, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum and all costs and 
attorney's fees, and if not paid, said amount will be secured 
hereby. 
19. Default. Buyer shall be in default hereunder if any of 
the following events occur: (a) Seller fails to make payments when 
due on any obligation secured hereby; (b) Seller fails to perform 
any other obligation hereunder when the same is to be performed; 
(c) any statement, representation or warranty of Buyer herein or 
in any other writing at any time furnished by Buyer to Seller is 
untrue in any material respect as of the date made; (d) Buyer 
becomes insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature or makes 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or any proceeding is 
instituted by or against the Buyer alleging that such Buyer is 
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insolvent or unable to pay debts as they mature; (e) entry of any 
judgment against Buyer; (f) death of Buyer; (g) the issuing of an 
attachment or garnishment, or the filing of a lien against the 
Cows, Replacement Cows and/or the Base; (h) the assignment by Buyer 
of any interest in the Cows, Replacement Cows and/or the Base 
without the written consent of Seller; (i) the breach by Buyer of 
any terms, provisions or conditions of the Lease. 
20. Remedies. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder 
and at any time thereafter, Seller may declare immediately due and 
payable all amounts secured hereby, and shall have the cumulative 
remedies of a secured party under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
and other applicable law, and: (a) Seller shall have the right to 
enter upon any premises where the Cows and Replacement Cows may be, 
and take possession thereof; and Buyer shall, if requested by 
Seller, assemble the Cows and Replacement Cows at a place 
designated by Seller; and Seller may sell, lease or otherwise 
dispose of the Cows and Replacement Cows in accordance with law, 
and after deducting all expenses for repossessing, maintaining, 
caring for, treating, transporting and disposing of the collateral 
and all attorney's fees, legal or other expenses in connection 
therewith, to apply the residue of the proceeds of such sale or 
sales to pay (or to hold as a reserve against) all obligations of 
Buyer secured hereby; and (b) Seller may obtain the appointment of 
a receiver, with or without notice to Buyer, for the purpose of 
possessing, managing and selling the Cows, Replacement Cows and the 
Base pursuant to this Contract; and (c) Seller may collect from 
Buyer all amounts remaining due after application of the proceeds 
as above provided. The remedies herein are cumulative and not 
alternative, and Buyer shall have all remedies provided by the laws 
of the State of Utah in addition to those expressly provided above. 
Seller shall have given Buyer reasonable notice of any sale or 
other disposition of the collateral if notice is mailed postage 
prepaid, addressed to Buyer at the address set forth herein at 
least five (5) days before the time of the sale or disposition. 
21. Additional Purchase. At the time of closing, the parties 
shall inventory all beet pulp, grain, whole cotton seed, brewer's 
pellets and haylage, and Buyer agrees to pay Seller the fair market 
value of all said enumerated feed in lawful money of the United 
States of America on the date of possession in addition to the 
purchase price herein provided. In addition, if any of the alfalfa 
hay of Seller stored in the hay barns described in the Lease as of 
the date of possession is of acceptable quality to Buyer, Buyer 
agrees to purchase from and pay to Seller the fair market value of 
such acceptable hay on the date of possession in lawful money of 
the United States of America, in addition to the purchase price 
herein provided. 
22. Property Retained. It is understood that the sale and 
purchase represented by this Contract does not include any of 
Seller's Hyoung stock", all of which young stock will be retained 
8 
by Seller. It Xb luxther understood that the pxopei ty and 
facilities whereon Seller's "young stockn is presently housed and 
where feed for such "young stockM is presently being stored is not 
a part of either this Contract or of the Lease, and title to and 
possession of all such property and facilities, together with 
ingress and egress thereto, is expressly retained by the Seller, 
In addition, Seller retains and shall be entitled to ownership and 
receipt of all patronage dividends, retained earnings and 
dividends, capital rotation and other benefits granted and/or paid 
by WDCI for milk sold by Seller to WDCI through August 31, 1989. 
23. Attorney's Fees and Costs. Should either party default 
xn any of the covenants or agreements contained in this Contract, 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this Contract or in obtaining possession of the property 
hereunder or in pursuing any remedy provided for by the laws of the 
State of Utahr whether such remedy in pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise. 
24. Paragraph Headings. The paragraph headings of this 
Contract are inserted only for convenience and in no way define, 
limit or describe the scope or intent of this Contract nor affect 
its terms and provisions. 
25. Binding Effect. This Contract shall be binding upon and 
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their respective heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors, trustees and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these presents are executed the day and 
year first above written. 
Norval R. Jone^V 
e-Af^r 3~ 
Delores S• Jones 
SELLER 
Witness 
LBH/1 
jones.con 
n v 
\%^^scA^X^ 
Michael J . Arami^L 
BUYER 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR Tllf COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORVALR JONES and 
DELORES S. JONES 
M N I I I 
i s 
l\\( 11 VI L I UlAMIil 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 930000077 
HONORABLE BEN II HADFIELD 
This matter was tried to the Court on July /, 1994. At the conclusion of the tiial (lie 
Court announced partial fmdings and decision and directed Counsel to conduct further 
research and submit written memoranda of points and authorities Plaintiffs Memorandum 
was submitted October 18, 1994. Defendant's Memorandum was submitted January 3, 1995. 
Both memoranda were substantially beyond the deadlines set by the Court. The Court will 
accept both memoranda and has reviewed the same, but notes that the passage of time 
compounds the difficulty in making a precise calculation concerning the issues. 
As previously indicated, the Court finds that the August 21, 1989 Lease is valid and 
enforceable and was never modified by the parties. The Court further finds that paragraph 
17 of the Lease empowers the Plaintiff to relet the premises if the Defendant is in default. 
Plaintiff testified he referred several inquiries concerning the property to the Defendant. 
Defendant testified that in November 1991, Plaintiff stated that because of difficulties and 
damages, he would "never relet the place again." The Court finds that Defendant's failure to 
pay the $1600.00 monthly rental constituted a breach of the Lease and commenced in July 
1992. Thereafter, it became incumbent upon the Plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to take adequate steps to mitigate damages after July 1, 
MICRO FLJVIBD 
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1993. Ihe Court will allow the rent to accrue tor the one year period tor the initial breach 
and finds that such a period of time would have been reasonable for the Plaintiff to seek 
othei ienters or find alternate ways of mitigating damages. Therefore, the Court finds that 
rent is due and owing for the period of July 1, 1992 through June 30, 1993 in the amount of 
$19,200 00 
During the period of July 1992 through June 30, 1993, the Plaintiff did take certain 
measures to mitigate damages and these shall be allowed as offsets as follows: 
Plaintiffs use of the coral $ 1,400.00 
Plaintiffs use of hay barn 2,000.00 
Plaintiffs sale of home 225.00 
in May 1993 
Total Mitigation Offset: $ 3,650.00 
Total rent owing from Defendant $15,550.00 
to Plaintiff after mitigation offset 
I he Court has reviewed the property damage claims of Plaintiff including the 
exhibits. During the term of the Lease, the facilities were already rather old and equipim iil 
"well worn". On the other hand, the exhibits leave little doubt that significant damage 
occurred during the period of Defendant's occupancy. Many of the damages claimed by 
Plaintiff would leave the Plaintiff with new equipment, whereas, the equipment at the 
commencement of the Lease was far from new. 
After reviewing the exhibits and evidence, the Court awards property damages in 
favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $5,980.00. 
Memorandum Decision 
Case #930000077 
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The Defendant having breached the Lease, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys 
fees incurred herein. Judgment is awarded against Defendants in the amount of $5,305.23 
for attorneys fees, and costs, together with such reasonable fees and costs as are hereafter 
documented from the date of trial until the Judgment is ultimately satisfied. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare comprehensive Findings and 
Conclusions as well as a Judgment in accordance with this decision. 
DATHUfiiN JLJ day of February, IW.V 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 22nd day of February , 1995, 
sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document 
o the following: 
Gregory Skabelund 
2176 North Main 
Logan, ITT 84 341 
L. Brent tioggan 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
88 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
District Court Clerk 
/ . By. /f>/7^y.VL^Vfew/ 
Katthi Johns ton , 
Deputy Clerk 

L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
SON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
88 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
-SAN. UTAH 843230525 
<80t) 752-1551 
TREMONTON OFFICE: 
123 EAST MAIN 
P.O. BOX 1 15 
MONTON. UTAH 84337 
<801) 2 5 7 3 8 8 5 
NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES 
S. JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 930 0 0Of)' ' ' < M 
This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00 
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice, 
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their 
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary 
evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the 
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the 
Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Under date of July 21, 1989 the Plaintiffs as Lessor 
entered into a written Lease with the Defendant as Lessee covering 
M I C R O * :Ii ^ = D 
DATE 
POLL NUMBER 
cf3- or? 
/Yp< w i U ^ 
c ^ r - / (\ 
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premises consisting of land, a milking parlor, milking equipment, 
two (2) hay sheds, milk cow lounging sheds, corrals, a silo, a I 
commodity shed, a tenant house and various items of farm machinery j 
and equipment. Said property will be referred to hereinafter as 
the Leased Premises. 
2. The term of the Lease was for five (5) years beginning 
September 1, 1989 and terminating at midnight on August 31, 1994. i 
3. By the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to pay 
Plaintiff monthly rental of $1,600.00 each month beginning Octoberj 
1, 1989 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter 
through and including September 1, 1994. 
4. Under the terms of the Lease, on any payment which was due 
which was not made on the due date or within five (5) days 
thereafter, Lessee agreed to pay a late charge of five percent (5%) 
of the unpaid amount of such installment. I 
5. Under the terms of the Lease, the Defendant agreed to care 
for and maintain the improvements constituting part of the Leased 
Premises and all equipment constituting a part of the Leased 
Premises in their condition as at the beginning of the Lease, 
reasonable wear and tear accepted. Defendant further covenanted 
under the terms of the Lease to promptly repair in a workmanlike 
manner all damage to improvements and all equipment constituting a 
part of the Lease Premises at Defendant's sole cost and expense. 
6. The Court finds that the Lease is valid and enforceable 
and was never terminated or modified by the parties either 
specifically or by a course of dealing between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant. 
7. The Defendant defaulted in the Lease by, among other 
things, failing to pay monthly rental payments thereon after July 
1, 1992 and by failure to keep the improvements on the Leased 
Premises in good order and by failure to care for and maintain the 
improvements on the premises and by abandoning the Leased Premises 
at or about the time Defendant ceased paying rental payments on the 
Lease. 
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8. The Plaintiffs, with the express consent of Defendant, 
used one (1) of the corrals and the hay barn on the Leased Premise 
subsequent to Defendant's vacating the same and sold the tenant 
house. The reasonable rental for the corral used by the Plaintiffs 
was $1,400.00, the reasonable value of the use of the hay barn by 
the Plaintiffs was $2,000.00 and interest earned by Plaintiffs on 
the proceeds from the sale of the tenant house from the time sold 
to the termination of the Lease is $225.00, making a total offset 
to which Defendant would be entitled for sums owing by Defendant to 
Plaintiffs under the Lease is $3,650.00. 
9. The Court finds that Plaintiffs had a continuing 
expectation that Defendant would return to and use the Leased 
Premises and for this reason failed to relet the premises and 
thereby mitigate their damages. The Court finds that this 
expectation on the Plaintiffs' part was reasonable but not for a 
period exceeding one (1) year from the date of the initial breach. 
Thereafter, the Court finds that it would have been reasonable for 
Plaintiffs to seek other renters or to find alternate ways of 
mitigating their damages. 
10. Based upon the foregoing findings of the Court, the Court 
determines that the rentals due under the Lease for a period of one 
(1) year after Defendant stopped making rental payments is the sum 
of $19,200.00 plus interest at ten percent (10%) from the date due 
until paid and late charges. Interest accrued to April 1, 1995 
totals $4,239.94 and late charges total $960.00. 
11. The Court finds that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claim 
that the damages to the Leased Premises caused by or as a result of 
the Defendant's unreasonable use of the same totaled $8,263.00, the 
actual sum of the claims were for replacement costs of old 
equipment and that under the circumstances, reasonable compensation 
for improvements damaged by the Defendant on the Leased Premises is 
$5,980.00 plus interest thereon from July 1, 1992 at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum Interest accrued to April 1, 1995 is 
$1,644.49. 
( / 
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12. The Court finds that the Lease provides f or the recovery 
of attorney's fees in the event of a default. The Court further 
finds that the Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action 
and determines that a reasonable attorney's fee for the period 
through the trial of this case is $5,305.23. 
13. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
their costs upon filing an appropriate cost bond and, further, are 
entitled reasonable fees and costs hereafter incurred and 
documented until ultimate satisfaction of this Court's judgment. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. That Judgment should enter in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the amount of 
$19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to April 1, 
1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 less 
mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn and 
for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease 
payments, interest and late charges of $20,749.94. 
2. Judgment should enter against Defendant for damages to the 
Leased Premises in the amount of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to 
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $1,644.49. 
3. Judgment should be in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of 
this case plus their costs and that judgment should provide that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment for such further costs and 
attorney's fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of 
Trial and until said Judgment is satisfied. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
i \ 
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DATED this tH 
day of A p r i l , 19 95 
tUL 
Ben H. Hadfiely 
District Court/ Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Defendant's Attorney, 
Gregory Skabelund, at 2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage 
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1995. 
/fduJ^TAffl**" 
L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/iones fof 
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NORVAL R. JONES and DELORES 
! S. JONES, 
i! 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
vs. 
! MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
Case No. 930000077 CV 
Defendant 
This matter came on for trial pursuant to notice at 9:00 
o'clock a.m. July 7, 1994 in the Courtroom in the Hall of Justice, 
Logan, Cache County, Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by their 
attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C, L. Brent Hoggan. The Defendant 
was present in person and was represented by his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. Witnesses were sworn and testified, documentary 
evidence was presented, the case was argued and briefed to the 
Court and the Court having heard the evidence, having examined the 
Memorandum of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
i0flOFlLME:Dj _ (to ~Oil 
q,\<\P ww 
1. That Judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendant for rentals due and unpaid in the 
amount of $19,200.00 plus late charges of $960.00 and interest to 
April 1, 1995 in the amount of $4,239.94 or a total of $24,299.94 
less mitigation of $3,650.00 for Plaintiffs' use of the corral barn 
and for the sale of the tenant house for a net amount of lease 
payments, interest and late charges of $20,749.94. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant for damages to the Leased Premises in the amount 
of $5,980.00 plus interest thereon to April 1, 1995 in the amount 
of $1,644.49. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against 
Defendant for $5,305.23 in attorney's fees through the trial of 
this case plus their costs plus such further costs and attorney's 
fees as Plaintiffs may incur from and after the date of Trial and 
until said Judgment is satisfied. 
Let Judgment enter accordingly. 
DATED this /<-/ day of April, 1995 
Ben H. Hadfield 
District Court Ju£lge 
SON & HOGGAN P C 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
88 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 525 
LOGAN UTAH 84323-0525 
(801) 752 1551 
TREMONTON OFFICE 
1 23 EAST MAIN 
P O BOX 1 1 5 
TREMONTON UTAH 84337 
(801) 257 3885 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Decree, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, at 
2176 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, 
this 29th day of March, 1995. 
/rj*£%for~ 
L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/iones lud 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
NORVAL R. JONES and 
DELORES S. JONES 
PLAINTIFFS, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. ARAMBEL, 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 930000077 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion To Alter Or 
Amend Judgment. The Court has reviewed the Motion, accompanying memorandum, 
Plaintiffs reply memorandum and Defendant's response. 
Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages and therefore 
should be awarded no damages. Defendant's argument seems to totally overlook the 
consequences of Defendant's undisputed breach. A duty to mitigate only arises if a breach 
occurs. In the typical occurrence, a lessee defaults in rent, a lessor makes efforts to obtain 
an alternate lessee, and within a reasonable period of time, that alternate lessee is making the 
rental payments or a portion thereof, thereby mitigating the damages. The Court held in this 
case, that reasonable mitigation efforts by Plaintiffs should have produced an alternate lessee 
witon one year irom th£ bieath. Trie breach occurred My \ , \9#1 Wnen I>eiendant iailei 
to pay the rent owing. 
The Court stands by its original decision concerning the mitigation issue. 
Judgment as prepared arid entered was, in the Court's view, the correct amount. 
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Defendant's second point of alleged error claims it was improper to award "post-
judgment interest". The argument following this assertion addresses the issue of "pre-
judgment interest". Presumably, Defendant's argument is directed to the issue of pre-
judgment interest. UCA 15-1-1 (2) provides an interest rate of 10% in circumstances such as 
the present. Plaintiff was entitled to interest at this rate from the date each amount became 
due and certain. The general prayer for relief in the Complaint is sufficient to cover the 
issue of statutory interest. 
The third error alleged by Defendant is that Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover 
their attorneys fees because Plaintiffs had failed to mitigate damages. This argument 
confiises two separate and distinct issues. The Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees due to 
the Defendant's breach of the Contract. The Plaintiffs failure to mitigate was not, in itself, a 
breach of the Contract, but rather was an occurrence which limited the amount of Plaintiffs' 
recovery. The award of attorneys fees and costs is affirmed. 
Defendants' Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment is denied in its entirety. Counsel 
for Plaintiffs is directed to prepare an Order in conformance herewith. 
j X 
DATED this i T day ofJttfifcr, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 6th 
I sent by first class mail a true and 
to the following: 
Brent Hoggan 
Olson and Hoggan 
88 West Center Street 
P. 0, Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
day of July , 1995, 
correct copy of the attached document 
Gregory Skabelund 
2176 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
District Court Clerk 
By: fifljAi^dsn^ljrf^ 
Kaujii Johnston, 
Deputy Clerk 
